Why This Matters to You

These cameras aren't just watching criminals. They're watching everyone. Every trip you make through Grafton may be photographed, logged, and stored in a database accessible to agencies 1,800 miles away.

This Is Not Just a Grafton Issue

While this site focuses on Grafton's deployment, this surveillance system has expanded far beyond our community:

• In Wisconsin: Over 200 law enforcement agencies now use Flock cameras, with hundreds of cameras deployed across the state
• Nationally: Flock operates more than 80,000 cameras in approximately 5,000 communities across 49 states
• Monthly scans: The system performs over 20 billion license plate scans nationwide every month

What happens in Grafton is part of a national surveillance network that crosses city, county, and state lines. Your movements tracked in Grafton can be searched by agencies in California, Texas, Florida, or anywhere else in the network.

What the Data May Reveal About Your Life

• Your place of worship (church, synagogue, mosque, temple - revealing religious beliefs)
• Your bank, tax preparer, or financial advisor (revealing financial activities and transactions)
• Medical facilities, pharmacies, or clinics (revealing health conditions and treatments)
• Your attorney's, accountant's, or therapist's office (undermining professional confidentiality)
• Political meetings, campaign events, or rallies (revealing political affiliations)
• Labor union meetings, veterans organizations, or advocacy groups (revealing associations)
• Friends' or family members' homes (revealing personal relationships)
• Where you were on any given day (creating a detailed timeline of your life)

Who Can See Our Data

When you drive through Grafton, your data doesn't stay in Grafton. The Village granted access to 591 law enforcement agencies across 32 states to search our movements without our knowledge. This includes agencies in California, Texas, Florida, and states you've never visited.

While Grafton deletes the data after 30 days, any of those 591 agencies can download and permanently store your location history if it's relevant to ANY investigation—even ones you're not involved in. Grafton residents have no way to know who accessed their data or why.

This Isn't About "Having Something to Hide"

Having nothing to hide doesn't mean you have no need for privacy. You probably close the door when using the bathroom, close curtains at night, and password-protect your phone, not because you're doing something wrong, but because privacy is a basic human need.

The Fourth Amendment protects this principle: government shouldn't track your movements without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.

The Scale: Studies show 99.95% of ALPR scans are of innocent people going about their daily lives. This isn't targeted law enforcement. It's mass surveillance.

What Are Flock Cameras?

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) that photograph every vehicle passing by. These cameras capture far more than just license plates:

• License plates + vehicle characteristics (make, model, color, bumper stickers, damage)
• Motion-activated, solar-powered, capture 6-12 images per vehicle
• Data stored for 30 days in cloud (Amazon Web Services)
• Real-time alerts for "hot list" vehicles (stolen cars, wanted suspects)
• Historical search capability by plate number or vehicle description

Key Points

• Technology captures MORE than just plates - creates detailed "vehicle fingerprints"
• Officers can search without probable cause or reasonable suspicion (per Grafton Policy 427)
• No facial recognition, but tracks vehicles and by extension, their owners

What's Happening in Grafton

Timeline

Contract Details

• Initial Contract: Year-to-year at $2,500/camera annually
• Current Contract: 5-year agreement (2024-2028)
• Cost: $2,500 per camera/year (locked in; new customers pay $3,000)
• FY 2024 Cost: $17,500 annually for 7 cameras
• Total 5-Year Commitment: $87,500 ($11,500 savings vs. new pricing)
• Funding Source: Property tax levy
• Installation Fee: $250 one-time per camera
• Includes: Installation, maintenance, cellular service, cloud hosting, software updates

Public Process

Based on available public records:

• Capital Improvement Program budgets confirm Village Board authorizations for camera purchases
• Detailed meeting minutes from January 2021 authorization are not publicly accessible through standard records requests
• Individual trustee votes are not documented in available public records
• Public comments or opposition are not documented in accessible minutes

Note: This may reflect record-keeping practices rather than absence of public input.

Chief's Justification

Police Chief Jeff Caponera cited retail theft as primary concern:

• 118 retail thefts reported in 2020
• Strategic placement at "every major point of ingress and egress"
• Goal: "capture data within the village so we know who is here"

ALPR Camera Locations in Ozaukee County

The map below shows crowdsourced ALPR camera locations from DeFlock, an open-source project mapping surveillance cameras worldwide. Data is community-verified and updated daily via OpenStreetMap.

About the Data: DeFlock is a crowdsourced database of over 16,000 ALPR cameras nationwide, protected by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) after Flock Safety attempted to shut it down with a cease-and-desist. All data comes from community contributions to OpenStreetMap and is regularly verified. Grafton operates 6-7 village-owned cameras, plus private entities (The Commons retail area) own additional cameras that Grafton Police can access.

Do These Cameras Actually Work?

Before accepting mass surveillance, we should ask: Does it actually reduce crime?

Multiple independent studies found little to no crime reduction from ALPR deployment:

• Mesa, Arizona (2012): No significant impact on crime
• Alexandria & Fairfax County, VA (2011): No significant crime reduction
• Baton Rouge, Louisiana (2019): No significant crime reduction
• Atlantic City (2025): No reduction in violent crime overall

Comprehensive Review (Koper et al., 2019):
"Little evidence that ALPRs reduce crime" and "less evidence on impact on clearance/solve rates"

Flock's Self-Conducted Survey

Company claims 10% of U.S. crime solved using Flock cameras, but:

• Company-administered survey (not independent research)
• Customer self-reporting (selection bias)
• No independent verification
• No comparison to non-Flock jurisdictions
• Study conducted by Flock employees with academic researchers' names added for credibility

Researcher Raises Concerns: Johnny Nhan of Texas Christian University, who oversaw the academic review of Flock's effectiveness study, now has serious doubts about the methodology. According to 404 Media, Nhan said he "would have done things much differently" and discovered that "the information that is collected by the police departments are too varied and incomplete for us to do any type of meaningful statistical analysis on them." This led him to pivot away from future Flock research entirely.

The Trade-Off: Comprehensive tracking of millions of innocent people, data breach risks, chilling effects on First Amendment activities, and disproportionate impact on vulnerable communities, all for minimal demonstrated crime reduction benefits.

What Can Go Wrong: Documented Abuses

Even well-intentioned surveillance systems can be abused. Here's what has actually happened in other communities:

Individual Officer Abuse

• Kansas police chief used Flock 228 times over 4 months to stalk ex-girlfriend
• Officers using systems to stalk ex-spouses and blackmail individuals
• No apparent disciplinary action in many cases

Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

• June 2024 CISA bulletin: 7 vulnerabilities in Motorola/Vigilant ALPRs
• Passwords for 35+ Flock customer accounts stolen
• No mandatory multi-factor authentication
• Border vendor Perceptics hacked with data published online

FTC Investigation Requested: Senator Ron Wyden and Rep. Krishnamoorthi called for investigation in 2025, alleging Flock "failing to implement cybersecurity protections and needlessly exposing Americans' sensitive personal data to theft by hackers and foreign spies."

The Data Breach Reality

Law enforcement agencies and their vendors experience frequent data breaches, putting ALPR location data at risk:

• 2023: Over 250 million Americans affected by data breaches at government agencies and contractors
• Law enforcement vendors: Thomson Reuters (2024), Perceptics (2019), and numerous police departments have experienced breaches exposing sensitive investigative data
• No uniform standards: Most local law enforcement agencies lack dedicated cybersecurity staff or mandatory security requirements
• Multi-agency access amplifies risk: With 591 agencies accessing Grafton's data, a breach at any one agency could expose your location history

Questions Grafton hasn't answered:

• What cybersecurity standards are required of the 591 agencies that can access our data?
• Who monitors whether agencies properly secure downloaded ALPR data?
• What happens to Grafton residents' data when it's breached at another agency?
• Does the Village have liability insurance for data breaches affecting residents?

15+ Cities Removed or Rejected Flock Cameras in 2025

Grafton isn't alone in deploying these cameras, but a growing number of communities are reversing course.

Municipal Removals & Terminations

• Evanston, IL: Forced to remove 19 cameras after state audit found unauthorized federal access violated Illinois law
• Eugene, OR: Disabled 57 cameras after public backlash over federal access
• Lynnwood, WA: Disabled 25 cameras after discovering unauthorized "nationwide search" access
• Redmond, WA: Unanimously voted to suspend cameras
• Stanwood & Sedro-Woolley, WA: Shut down after judge ruled footage is public record

Council Rejections

• Denver, CO: City Council unanimously rejected extension (Mayor overrode)
• Cambridge, MA: Unanimously voted to pause 16 cameras
• Austin, TX: Terminated contract after community pushback
• Oak Park, IL: Terminated over federal access and state law violations

Bipartisan Opposition

• Sedona, AZ: Conservative-led grassroots campaign led unanimous council vote to remove cameras
• Tennessee: Right-wing activists opposing "tracking system for law-abiding citizens"
• Opposition spans political spectrum: conservatives cite government overreach; progressives cite privacy concerns

This isn't a partisan issue. Communities on both the left and right are recognizing that comprehensive surveillance of innocent people is incompatible with a free society.

Why This May Violate the Fourth Amendment

The Core Constitutional Concern

Automated License Plate Readers create comprehensive, searchable records of everyone's movements (innocent people and criminals alike) without warrants, probable cause, or individualized suspicion. This resembles the general warrants and writs of assistance that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit.

The Fourth Amendment:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause..."

The Carpenter Precedent (2018)

In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that accessing comprehensive location data tracking a person's movements over time constitutes a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant. Key findings:

• Data was "detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled"
• Covered an extended period (127 days)
• Generated automatically without user action
• Technology was "indispensable to participation in modern society"
• Enabled retrospective "time travel" tracking

How Grafton's ALPRs Match Carpenter's Concerns

• ✓ Detailed, encyclopedic, effortlessly compiled
• ✓ Covers extended periods (30-day retention)
• ✓ Automatic, no driver action required
• ✓ Driving is indispensable in car-dependent communities
• ✓ Enables retrospective searches ("where was this car 2 weeks ago?")
• ✓ Tracks innocent people without suspicion

Current Legal Status

• No federal appellate court has definitively ruled on ALPR constitutionality post-Carpenter
• Courts have reached conflicting conclusions
• Massachusetts: 4 cameras at 2 locations insufficient to violate Fourth Amendment
• Virginia: Split decisions on 172-camera system
• Norfolk federal case proceeding to trial October 2025
• No Wisconsin court has addressed the issue

The Greater Good Argument Doesn't Justify Unconstitutional Searches

Police could solve more crimes if they could search every home without warrants, read everyone's emails without subpoenas, track everyone's phones without court orders, or install cameras in every private space. We don't allow these things because we value constitutional rights over efficiency. The same principle applies to mass ALPR surveillance. Catching criminals doesn't justify treating every citizen as a suspect under constant surveillance.

The Better Alternative: Flag-and-Discard

ALPRs can serve legitimate law enforcement purposes WITHOUT creating a surveillance database of innocent people.

New Hampshire's Model

• Cameras check plates against "hot lists" (stolen vehicles, AMBER alerts, wanted suspects)
• Non-hits deleted within 3 minutes
• Only flagged vehicles stored
• Still enables real-time alerts for actual criminal investigations
• Eliminates dragnet surveillance of innocent people

Why This Works

• ✓ Finds stolen cars and missing persons
• ✓ Alerts for wanted suspects
• ✓ No comprehensive tracking database
• ✓ No Fourth Amendment concerns
• ✓ No data breach risk for innocent people
• ✓ No mission creep to tracking bumper stickers or political affiliations

ACLU Position: New Hampshire's 3-minute deletion for non-hits is the "gold standard" - it serves legitimate law enforcement needs while protecting civil liberties.

Grafton vs. New Hampshire: A Comparison

Why Grafton's 30-Day Retention Is Problematic

• Creates searchable database of every vehicle that entered Grafton over past month
• Enables retrospective investigations without warrants
• Allows searches based on vehicle characteristics (bumper stickers, roof racks)
• Accessible to 591 agencies for unrelated investigations
• No individual suspicion or probable cause required

The Data Sharing Network

Grafton's camera data is accessible to 591 law enforcement agencies spanning 32+ states, some up to 1,800 miles away from Grafton. Reciprocally, Grafton Police can access cameras from 1,000+ agencies nationwide.

Who Has Access?

What Data Is Collected?

Data Retention

• 30 days before hard deletion (per Policy 427)
• Exception: Data relevant to investigations can be downloaded and stored as evidence
• Encryption in transit and at rest

Who Controls It

• Flock Safety, Inc. owns hardware and data
• Grafton Police Department has access
• 591 other agencies have access through network sharing
• Template contract grants Flock "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free license" to share data

Policy & Oversight

Grafton Police Department Policy 427

• Adopted September 2021, updated September 2025
• No warrant required for ALPR searches
• No reasonable suspicion required for searches
• Officers must document search reason and link to case number
• All searches automatically logged with audit trail
• Prohibits "blanket searches absent bona fide reason"
• Restricts to "official and legitimate law enforcement business"

Authorized Uses

• Identify stolen vehicles, wanted persons, missing persons
• Assist criminal investigations
• Locate witnesses or victims
• Verify vehicle information

Prohibited Uses

• Personal surveillance
• Tracking individuals based on protected characteristics
• Blanket searches without legitimate purpose
• Non-law enforcement uses

Oversight

• Audit logs reviewed by supervisors
• No independent civilian oversight
• No public reporting on usage statistics
• Department does not track external agency access to Grafton data

Key Findings from Public Records Request

In response to a public records request (October 28, 2025), Grafton Police Department provided the following information (November 11, 2025):

• Department does NOT track how many times external agencies access Grafton data
• No separate MOUs governing data sharing beyond Flock system access
• No direct federal agency access, but department "not aware" if federal agencies have accessed through network
• Other agencies bound by "their own departmental policies" for data retention - no Grafton control
• Use restricted to "legitimate law enforcement purposes" but no enforcement mechanism

The Transparency Problem

Flock Safety offers an optional "transparency portal" that agencies can enable to make audit data publicly viewable. However:

• Grafton has NOT enabled its transparency portal - the public cannot see how Grafton officers use the system
• Transparency portals are opt-in, meaning most agencies keep usage data secret
• According to Eyes on Flock (a third-party monitoring site), only a small fraction of Flock-equipped agencies have public portals
• Of agencies that do enable transparency, the top search reasons are vague: "INVESTIGATION" (25,835 searches), "INV" (15,289), and "INVEST" (9,740)

Wisconsin-Specific Concerns

A 2025 Wisconsin Examiner investigation analyzed Flock audit data and found troubling patterns:

• 221 Wisconsin agencies used Flock from January to May 2025
• Many agencies entered vague search reasons like "investigation" with no context, or simply used a period (".") as the reason
• West Allis PD led the state in using only "." as a search reason - over 1,200 times
• Brown County Sheriff's Office (Wisconsin's 2nd highest Flock user) has NO Flock-specific policy
• Top statewide search reason: "investigation" (vague, no specifics provided)

Milwaukee PD Accessed Illinois Cameras for "Classified" Investigation

In May 2025, Wisconsin Examiner revealed that Milwaukee Police Department's intelligence unit (STAC - Southeastern Threat Analysis Center) accessed Flock cameras in Danville, Illinois for a "classified" investigation. Key findings:

• Three searches conducted in July and October 2024 logged as "HSI investigation" (Homeland Security Investigations)
• By tapping into Danville's network, Milwaukee accessed 4,893-5,425 Flock networks nationwide - demonstrating how one agency's data opens access to thousands of others
• MPD stated the investigation was "classified," claiming it was a federal drug trafficking investigation (HIDTA)
• ACLU Wisconsin raised concerns about lack of oversight and public notification

Implication: This case demonstrates how network sharing allows agencies to access cameras far outside their jurisdiction. A single search by one Wisconsin agency can pull data from thousands of networks across the country without the knowledge or consent of the communities being surveilled.

ACLU of Wisconsin (Amanda Merkwae):
"If law enforcement told us that they wanted to put a tracking device on every single car in the country so that we know where every car is every single moment of the day, and we're going to build a database of all those locations run by an unaccountable private company, and accessible to every law enforcement agency across the country without needing any type of a warrant, I think we would be alarmed."

ACLU of Wisconsin (John McCray Jones):
"This level of opacity is unacceptable. Vague entries like 'investigation' or a period provide no meaningful oversight and violate the spirit of transparency and democracy. This kind of documentation undermines any public trust or accountability."

Note: Grafton Police Department did not appear in the Wisconsin Examiner's analysis, suggesting either lower usage or that Grafton's audit data was not accessible through the public records request methods used. No Ozaukee County agencies appear to have enabled Flock's transparency portal.

What Civil Liberties Organizations Say

ACLU Warning:
"Flock is creating a form of mass surveillance unlike any seen before in American life, photographing more than 1 billion vehicles monthly and creating a centralized database searchable by law enforcement nationwide."

Key ACLU Concerns

• Accuracy Problems: 10% misidentification error rate; NCIC database notoriously inaccurate
• Mission Creep: Expanding from plates to vehicle fingerprints, bumper stickers (First Amendment concerns)
• Disproportionate Impact: Enables over-policing in communities of color
• Lack of Accountability: No legal requirement to honor 30-day retention; company can change policies anytime

Electronic Frontier Foundation Findings

• 99.95% of scans are innocent people (California data: only 0.05% relevant to public safety)
• Disproportionate deployment in low-income communities and communities of color
• Documented abuses: NYPD surveilling mosque attendees, officers stalking ex-spouses
• Data breaches affecting millions of innocent people's location history

Recommended Safeguards

If ALPRs deployed despite opposition:

• 3-minute deletion for non-hits (New Hampshire model)
• Warrant requirements for historical searches
• Hot list certification and accuracy audits
• No third-party sharing
• Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ordinances requiring council approval
• Regular independent audits with public reporting
• Restricted access to trained personnel only

The "Buying Data" Loophole

Even if courts require warrants for ALPR searches, government can potentially bypass this protection by purchasing data from private companies instead of compelling its production.

The Third-Party Doctrine Problem

• Traditional doctrine: no privacy in information "voluntarily" given to third parties
• Carpenter limited this for comprehensive digital surveillance
• But if government BUYS data on the open market, some argue this isn't "state action"
• Creates loophole: warrant required for compelled production, but not for purchased data?

This Already Happens

• NSA and FBI purchase location data from commercial data brokers (per Sen. Ron Wyden)
• Private ALPR vendors maintain commercial databases with 6.5+ billion scans for sale
• Vigilant Solutions sells ALPR data to private entities and government
• No warrant, no subpoena, just payment

Why This Matters for Grafton

• Flock Safety owns Grafton's camera data
• Template contract grants Flock "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free license" to share
• Even if courts require warrants, federal agencies could potentially buy access
• Local policies may be superseded by Flock's contract terms

Wisconsin's Regulatory Vacuum

Wisconsin has enacted NO statutes regulating ALPRs:

• No data retention limits
• No warrant requirements
• No transparency mandates
• No oversight mechanisms
• No community approval processes
• No state agency monitoring deployment

200+ Wisconsin agencies deployed Flock partnerships with no state-level review, uniform standards, or accountability.

Existing Laws Don't Apply

• Privacy statutes only protect "private places" - not public roads
• Electronic surveillance laws focus on wiretapping, not visual surveillance
• Proposed Wisconsin Data Privacy Act explicitly exempts government entities

ACLU-Wisconsin Advocacy

Calling for Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ordinances requiring:

• Transparent decision-making
• Public input before deployment
• Regular independent audits
• City council approval

Only Madison has adopted CCOPS protections. Milwaukee, Grafton, and most Wisconsin municipalities operate without these safeguards.

Common Questions

"I have nothing to hide. Why should I care?"

Having nothing to hide doesn't mean you have no need for privacy. You probably close the door when using the bathroom, close curtains at night, and password-protect your phone, not because you're doing something wrong, but because privacy is a basic human need.

The Fourth Amendment protects this principle: government shouldn't track your movements without individualized suspicion. It's not about hiding criminal activity. It's about maintaining freedom from constant government surveillance.

"Don't we need these cameras to catch criminals?"

The question isn't whether ALPRs can help investigations. It's whether we need to track EVERYONE to catch the few who commit crimes. New Hampshire's model shows you can have real-time alerts for stolen vehicles and wanted suspects while deleting data on innocent people within 3 minutes.

You can have effective law enforcement AND constitutional protections. Multiple independent studies show ALPRs have minimal impact on crime reduction, while creating massive privacy costs.

"If this violates the Fourth Amendment, wouldn't courts have stopped it?"

Constitutional challenges are expensive and time-consuming. Many ALPR cases are still working through the courts. In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled in Carpenter v. United States that comprehensive location tracking requires warrants, but lower courts haven't yet definitively applied this to ALPRs.

Just because something is currently legal doesn't mean it's constitutional. Segregation was legal until courts ruled otherwise. No Wisconsin court has addressed this issue.

"The police say they only use it for legitimate investigations. What's the problem?"

Grafton's policy prohibits misuse, but enforcement relies entirely on police self-auditing. There's no independent oversight, no public reporting, and the department doesn't track how external agencies use Grafton's data.

We've seen documented abuses in other communities (officers stalking ex-partners, unauthorized searches) even where policies prohibited such use. Good policies aren't enough without independent oversight and accountability.

"Isn't this just like security cameras in stores?"

Store cameras are:

• Limited to private property
• Controlled by the business owner
• Not networked with 591 other stores
• Not searchable by government without a warrant
• Not tracking your movements across an entire town for 30 days

ALPR systems create comprehensive, government-controlled surveillance networks that track everyone's movements across public spaces. The scale and scope are fundamentally different.

"What about people who support these cameras? Are they wrong?"

Supporters make valid points about investigative benefits:

• ALPRs can help solve property crimes and locate stolen vehicles
• They provide objective evidence for investigations
• The cost is relatively modest ($2,500/camera/year)

These are legitimate considerations. Our position is that these benefits don't require tracking EVERY person's movements. New Hampshire's flag-and-discard model achieves the same law enforcement goals while better protecting civil liberties. It's not law enforcement vs. privacy. It's finding the right balance.

What You Can Do

Contact Village Officials

Express your concerns to the Village Board, Public Safety Committee, and Police Chief about:

• Lack of warrant requirements for searches
• Extensive out-of-state data sharing (591 agencies)
• Potential federal agency access
• Absence of independent oversight
• No public reporting on effectiveness or civil liberties impacts

Village of Grafton Contact Information:

• Village Hall: (262) 375-5300
• Police Department: (262) 375-5320
• Website: villageofgraftonwi.gov

Demand Transparency

• Request public disclosure of camera locations
• Ask for annual reports on usage statistics and effectiveness
• Demand data on external agency access patterns
• Request disclosure of all data sharing agreements

Advocate for Protections

• Support Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ordinances
• Demand warrant requirements for historical searches
• Advocate for 3-minute deletion for non-hits (New Hampshire model)
• Call for independent audits with public reporting

Support State-Level Regulation

Contact your Wisconsin State legislators to advocate for legislation establishing:

• Data retention limits
• Warrant requirements for ALPR searches
• Transparency mandates and public reporting
• Community approval processes before deployment

Share This Information

Help educate your neighbors about surveillance in our community:

• Share this website: 53024.org
• Attend Village Board meetings and raise these concerns
• Talk to friends and neighbors about constitutional implications
• Write letters to local newspapers